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Abstract
In this paper we present our approach for the modeling and the synthesis of
enforcement mechanismsthat are mechanism able to force security policies. In
particular, starting from the definition of security automata introduced in the lit-
erature by Schneider, Ligatti et al., we define a set of process algebra operators,
said controller operators, able to mimic the security automata’s behavior. Hence
we present semantics definitions of four different controller operators that act by
monitoring possible un-trusted component of a given system. They guarantee that
the whole system is secure, i.e. it works as prescribed by a given security policy.
We also present our theory for automatically building a process that is a controller
program for a chosen controller operator. By exploiting satisfiability results on
temporal logic we have developed a tool that generates such processes. The tool
implements the partial model checking technique and a satisfiability procedure for
a modal µ-calculus formula.
We then present how it is possible to extend our approach in a timed setting
and to deal with parameterized systems.
Keywords: Partial model checking, process algebra operators, security property,
controller operator, synthesis of controller program.
1 Introduction
In the last few years the amount or information and sensible data that circulate on the
net has been growing up. This is one of important reasons that have contributed to
increase research on the definition of formal method for the analysis and the verifica-
tion of secure systems, i.e. systems that satisfy some security properties that specify
acceptable executions of programs.
An interesting approach is based on the idea that potential attackers should be an-
alyzed as if they were un-specified components of a system; thus reducing security
∗This work is an expanded and revised version of [30, 31].
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analysis to the analysis of open systems. As a matter of fact the behavior of an open
system may be not completely specified and may present some uncertainty (see [29]).
Recently the interest on developing techniques to study how to make a system
secure by enforcing security policy is growing (e.g. see [5, 9, 10, 41]).
We have extended the verification approach of [29] with a method for automatically
enforcing the desired security property. As a matter of fact we define process algebra
operators (see [32]) said controller operators and denoted by Y . X , where Y is the
controller program and X is the target system, i.e. a possible un-trusted component.
Schneider in [41] has defined the concept of enforcement mechanism as a program
that control that a given security property is respected. He has also given a definition of
security automaton as an automaton that processes a sequence of input actions that has
finite or infinite length. It works by monitoring the target system, i.e. an application
whose behavior is unknown, and terminating any execution that is about to violate the
security policy being enforced. Starting form his definition, Ligatti et al. described
four different ways to enforce safety policies ([9, 10]). The truncation automaton
can recognize bad sequences of actions and halts program execution before a security
property is violated, but cannot otherwise modify program behavior. The suppression
automaton can suppress individual program actions without terminating the program
outright in addition to being able to halt program execution. The third automaton is
the insertion automaton that is able to insert a sequence of actions into the program
actions stream as well as terminate the program. The last one is the edit automaton. It
combines the power of suppression and insertion automaton hence it is able to truncate
actions sequences and can insert or suppress security-relevant actions at will.
In this paper, we model security automata defined in [9, 10] through process algebra
by defining controller operators Y .K X , where K ∈ {T, S, I, E} where T , S, I and
E represent Truncation, Suppression, Insertion and Edit automaton respectively. We
give the semantics definition of each of controller operator and prove that they have the
same behavior of the respective security automaton.
In order to express security policies we use equational µ-calculus formulae because
many properties of systems are naturally specified by means of fixed points and it is
very expressive.
Hence, at the beginning, we have a system S and an equational µ-calculus formula
φ that express a safety policy. Our goal is to guarantee that ∀X , S‖X |= φ. First of all
we apply the partial model checking function in order to evaluate the formula φ by the
behavior of S. In this way we obtain a new formula φ′ = φ//S and we have to monitor
only the necessary/untrusted part of the system, here X . Hence we force X to enjoy φ′
by using an appropriate controller Y ¤K X .
Our approach permits us to automatically synthesize a controller program Y for
a given controller operator Y .K X by exploiting satisfiability procedure for the µ-
calculus. Moreover we show our tool that is effectively able to generate a controller
program Y starting from a system S and φ.
An advantage of this approach for enforcing is that we are able to control only
the possible un-trusted component of a given system. Other approaches deal with the
problem of monitoring the component X to enjoy a given property, by treating it as the
whole system of interest. However, often not all the system needs to be checked (or it is
simply not convenient to check it as a whole). Some components could be trusted and
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one would like to have a method to constrain only un-trusted ones (e.g. downloaded
applets). Similarly, it could not be possible to build a monitor for a whole distributed
architecture, while it could be possible to have it for some of its components.
In the last part of the paper we present further results on how our controller op-
erators can be use also to force security policies in a timed setting and to treat with
parameterized systems, S = Pn where n is the parameter and Pn = P‖P‖ . . . ‖P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
Our logical approach is also able to deal with composition problems, that have been
considered as an interesting issue in [9]. As a matter of fact we present how we are
able to enforce a policies that is a composition of several sub-policies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some related work, Section 3
recalls basic theory about process algebras, modal logic and the partial model checking
technique. Section 4 briefly explains how we use open system for security analysis.
Section 5 describes our controller operators and shows how they model security au-
tomata. Section 6 presents our theory for the synthesis of process algebra controller
operators and describes the architecture of our tool. Section 7 shows an example of
application. Section 8 presents some related results and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
In the literature a lot of works are about the study of enforceable properties and mecha-
nism. In this paper we deal with two different aspect, the modeling of security automata
and the synthesis of controller program.
Security automata was introduced by Schneider in [41] as a triple (Q, q0, δ) where
Q is a set of states, q0 is the initial state and, being Act the set of security-relevant
actions, δ : Act×Q → 2Q is the transition function. A security automaton processes
a sequence of actions a1a2 . . . one by one. For each action, the current global state Q′
is calculated, by initially starting from {q0}. As each ai is read, the security automaton
changesQ′ in⋃q∈Q′ δ(ai, q). If the automaton can make a transition on a given action,
i.e. Q′ is not empty, then the target is allowed to perform that action. The state of
the automaton changes according to transition rules. Otherwise the target execution is
terminated. A security property that can be enforced in this way corresponds to a safety
property (according to [41], a property is a safety one, if whenever it does not hold in
a trace then it does not hold in any extension of this trace).
Starting from the Schneider’s work, Ligatti et al. in [9, 10] have defined four differ-
ent kinds of security automata which deal with finite sequences of actions: truncation
automaton, suppression automaton, insertion automaton and edit automaton.
Our work represents a significant contribution to the previous works (see [9, 10,
25, 41]), because by modeling these automata by process algebra operators we are
able to deal also with the synthesis problem. This problem for the security automata
was not addressed in previous works. In fact, most of the related works deal with the
verification rather than with the synthesis problem.
Other works present different frameworks to model, analyze and study security
automata, but do not deal with the synthesis problem. In [7], for example, the authors
propose, by using CSP−OZ, a specification language combining Communicating Se-
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quential Processes (CSP ) and Object-Z (OZ), to specify security automata, formalize
their combination with target systems, and analyze the security of the resulting system
specifications. They provide theoretical results relating CSP −OZ specifications and
security automata and show how refinement can be used to reason about specifications
of security automata and their combination with target systems.
Also Bartoletti, Degano and Ferrari in [6] refer to [41] saying that while safety
properties can be enforced by an execution monitor, liveness properties cannot. In order
to enforce safety and liveness properties, they enclose security-critical code in policy
framings, in particular safety framings and liveness framings, that enforce respectively
safety and liveness properties of execution histories. This is however a static analysis
that over-approximates behavior history expressions. On the contrary we monitor the
target at run-time.
The synthesis problem is addressed in different topic (e.g. [4, 40, 23, 48] ).
In [28], a preliminary work has been provided that is based on different techniques
for automatically synthesizing systems enjoying a very strong security property, i.e.,
SBSNNI (see [18]). That work did not deal with controllers.
On the other hand much of prior works are about the study of enforceable properties
and related mechanisms but they do not deal with synthesis problem. In [16] the authors
deal with a safety interface that permits to study if a module is safe or not in a given
environment.
We use controller synthesis in order to force a system to guarantee security policy.
The synthesis of controllers is also, however, studied in other research areas. There
are approaches exploits satisfiability procedure. Usually this kind of approaches are
used when properties are expressed using linear time logic or similar [19, 39]. Many
approaches to the controller synthesize problem are based on game theory. As matter
of fact, different kinds of automata are used to model properties that must be enforced.
Games are defined on the automata in order to find the structure able to satisfy the
given properties. Example of these paper are [3, 22, 26, 35, 36, 38].
3 Process algebra, logics and partial model checking
In this section we show preliminary notions that are useful to understand the results
that we are going to present in this work.
3.1 A process algebra
In this subsection we recall the CCS process algebra introduced by Milner in [33].
We describe the semantics of CCS by using the Generalized Structural Operational
Semantics, GSOS for short (see [27]). This format of operational semantics was intro-
duced by Bloom et al. in [1, 12, 13] by following the treatment proposed by Simpson
in [42]. We choose to introduce this semantics specification because it is more suitable
than SOS for defining controller operators behavior.
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3.1.1 Generalized Structural Operational Semantics
Let V be a set of variables, ranged over by x, y, . . ., and letAct be a finite set of actions,
ranged over by a, b, c, . . .. A signature Σ is a pair (F, ar) where:
• F is a set of function symbols, disjoints from V ,
• ar : F 7→ N is a rank function which gives the arity of a function symbol; if
f ∈ F and ar(f) = 0 then f is called a constant symbol.
Given a signature, let W ⊆ V be a set of variables. It is possible to define the set of
Σ-terms over W as the least set such that every element in W is a term and if f ∈ F ,
ar(f) = n and t1, . . . , tn are terms then f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term. It is also possible to
define an assignment as a function γ from the set of variables to the set of terms such
that γ(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f(γ(t1), . . . γ(tn)). Given a term t, let V ars(t) be the set of
variables in t. A term t is closed if V ars(t) = ∅.
Now we are able to describe the GSOS format. A GSOS rule r has the following
format:
{xi aij−→ yij}1≤i≤k1≤j≤mi {xi 6
bij−→}1≤i≤k1≤j≤ni
f(x1, . . . , xk)
c−→ g(~x, ~y) (1)
where all variables are distinct; ~x and ~y are the vectors of all xi and yij variables
respectively; mi, ni ≥ 0 and k is the arity of f . We say that f is the operator of the
rule (op(r) = f ) and c is the action. A GSOS system G is given by a signature and a
finite set of GSOS rules. Given a signature Σ = (F, ar), an assignment ζ is effective
for a term f(s1, . . . , sk) and a rule r if:
1. ζ(xi) = si for 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
2. for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ mi, it holds that ζ(xi) aij−→ ζ(yij);
3. for all i, j with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, it holds that ζ(xi) 6 bij−→,
The formal semantics of terms is described by a labeled transition system, LTS for
short. It is a pair (E , T ) where E is the set of terms and T is a ternary relation T ⊆
(E × Act × E), known as a transition relation. The transition relation among closed
terms can be defined in the following way: f(s1, . . . , sn)
c−→ s if and only if there
exists an effective assignment ζ for a rule r with operator f and action c such that
s = ζ(g(~x, ~y)). There exists a unique transition relation induced by a GSOS system
(see [13]) and this transition relation is finitely branching.
3.1.2 CCS process algebra
Process algebras (or process calculi) are approaches to formally modeling concurrent
systems. Process algebras provide a method for the high-level description of inter-
actions, communications, and synchronizations between a collection of independent
agents or processes. An interesting process calculi is the Calculus of Communicat-
ing Systems, CCS for short, developed by Robin Milner (see [33]). Its actions model
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Prefixing:
a.x
a−→ x
Choice:
x
a−→ x′
x+ y a−→ x′
y
a−→ y′
x+ y a−→ y′
Parallel:
x
a−→ x′
x‖y a−→ x′‖y
y
a−→ y′
x‖y a−→ x‖y′
x
l−→ x′ y l¯−→ y′
x‖y τ−→ x′‖y′
Restriction:
x
a−→ x′
x\L a−→ x′\L
Relabeling:
x
a−→ x′
x[f ]
f(a)−→ x′[f ]
Table 1: GSOS system for CCS.
indivisible communications between exactly two participants. The notion of communi-
cation considered is a synchronous one, i.e. both processes must agree on performing
the communication at the same time.
Let L ⊆ Act be a finite set of actions, L¯ = {a¯ | a ∈ L} be the set of comple-
mentary actions where¯is a bijection with a¯ = a, Actτ be L ∪ L¯ ∪ {τ}, where τ is
the special action that denotes an internal computation step (or communication) and Π
be a set of constant symbols that can be used to define processes with recursion. We
define the signature ΣCCS = (FCCS , ar) as follows.
FCCS = {0,+, ‖} ∪ {a.|a ∈ Actτ} ∪ {\L|L ⊆ L ∪ L¯}∪
∪ {[f ]|f : Actτ 7→ Actτ} ∪Π
where f(τ) = τ . The function ar is defined as follows: ar(0) = 0 and for every
pi ∈ Π we have ar(pi) = 0, ‖ and + are binary operators and the other ones are unary
operators.
The operational semantics of CCS closed terms is given in Table 1 by means
of the GSOS and by LTS (E , T ), where E is a set of process terms ranged over by
E,F, P,Q, . . ., and T is a transition relation. We denote by Der(E) the set of deriva-
tives of a (closed) term E, i.e. the set of processes that can be reached from E through
the transition relation T .
Informally the semantics of CCS terms is the following:
Prefix: a (closed) term a.E represents a process that performs an action a and then
behaves as E.
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Choice: the term E + F represents the non-deterministic choice between the pro-
cesses E and F . Choosing the action of one of the two components, the other is
dropped.
Parallel composition: the term E‖F represents the parallel composition of the two
processes E and F . It can perform an action if one of the two processes can
perform an action, and this does not prevent the capabilities of the other process.
The third rule of parallel composition is characteristic of this calculus, it ex-
presses that the communication between processes happens whenever both can
perform complementary actions. The resulting process is given by the parallel
composition of the successors of each component, respectively.
Restriction: the process E\L behaves like E but the actions in L ∪ L¯ are forbidden.
To force a synchronization on an action between parallel processes, we have to
set restriction operator in conjunction with parallel one.
Relabeling: the process E[f ] behaves like the E but the actions are renamed viaf .
3.1.3 Behavioral Equivalences
There are a lot of scenarios in which it is important to understand when two different
processes have the same behavior. Several behavioral relations are defined in order to
compare the behavior of different processes. Here we are interested in strong and weak
simulation and bisimulation
Strong simulation and bisimulation equivalences Look at the following example:
Example 3.1 Consider two vendor machine E and F which behaviors can be repre-
sented by the following figure:
c
E F
a
b c
a a
b
These two process are not equivalent. To underline the way they differ, we introduce a
notion of simulation according to which F can simulate E, but not viceversa. Infor-
mally, to say “F simulates E” means that F ’s behavior pattern is at least as rich as
that of E.
Definition 3.1 Let (E ,→) be an LTS of concurrent processes over the set of actions
Actτ , and let R be a binary relation over E . Then R is called strong simulation,
denoted by ≺, over (E ,→) if and only if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R we have:
if E a−→ E′ then ∃ F ′ s.t. F a−→ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
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A strong bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are strong simulations. We
represent with ∼ the union of all the strong bisimulations.
Weak simulation and bisimulation equivalences Look at the following figure:
E F
a b a
b
τ
The processes E and F cannot be consider equivalent, since the second perform an
internal action by reaching a state where an action a is no longer possible. To compare
two processes like the processes in the previous figure Milner in [33] proposed the
notion of weak bisimulation.
Let τˆ = ² and if a 6= τ then aˆ = a. Moreover, we have
E
τ=⇒ E′ (E ⇒ E′ or E ²=⇒ E′) if E τ→∗ E′
E
aˆ=⇒ E′ if E τ=⇒ aˆ−→ τ=⇒ E′
whereE τ−→∗ E′ is the transitive and reflexive closure of τ−→. Note thatE τ=⇒ aˆ−→ τ=⇒
E′ is a short notation for E τ⇒ Eτ aˆ→ E′τ τ⇒ E′ where Eτ and E′τ denote intermediate
states that is not important for this framework.
The weak bisimulation relation permits to abstract to some extent from the internal
behavior of the system, represented by the internal τ action.
Definition 3.2 Let (E ,→) be an LTS of concurrent processes over the set of actions
Actτ , and letR be a binary relation over E . ThenR is called weak simulation, denoted
by ¹, over (E ,→) if and only if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R we have:
if E a−→ E′ then ∃ F ′ s.t. F a=⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R,
A weak bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are weak simulations. We
represent with ≈ the union of all the weak bisimulations.
An important result proved by Milner is the following.
Proposition 3.1 ([33]) Every strong simulation is also a weak one.
Example 3.2 Let we consider three different processes E, F and P as in the following
figure. It is easy to not that F and P are weakly bisimilar. On the contrary E and F
(P ) are not weakly bisimilar.
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Fa
b c
P
a
b c
a c
b
E
τ
τ
τ
τ
E 6≈ F ≈ P
3.2 Two variants of µ-calculus
In this subsection we describe two different variants of µ-calculus: modal µ-calculus
and equational µ-calculus.
Modal µ-calculus Modal µ-calculus is a process logic which extends HML logic
(see [20]) by adding fix-point operators in order to reason directly about recursive def-
initions of properties. It permits us to analyze non terminating behavior of systems. It
is a powerful temporal logic which subsumes several other logics such as CTL,CTL∗
and ECTL∗ (see [11, 17, 46]). As usual for µ-calculi, for the interpretation of the
formulas we might consider LTS.
Let a be in Actτ and Z be a variable ranging over a finite set of variables V ,
formulae are generated by the following grammar:
φ ::= Z | T | F | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | 〈a〉φ | [a]φ | µZ.φ | νZ.φ
The possibility modality 〈a〉φ expresses the ability to have an a transition to a state that
satisfies φ. The necessity modality [a]φ expresses that after each a transition there is
a state that satisfies φ. We consider the usual definitions of bound and free variables.
The interpretation of a closed formula φ w.r.t. an LTS M is the set of states where φ is
true. The interpretation of a formula φ(Z) with a free variable Z is a function from set
of states to set of states. Hence, the interpretation of µZ.φ(Z) (νZ.φ(Z)) is the least
(greatest) fix-point of this function. The interpretation of a formula with free variable
is a monotonic function, so a least (greatest) fix-point exists.
Formally, given an LTS M = 〈S,→〉, the semantics of a formula φ is a subsetJφKρ of the states of M , defined in Table 2, where ρ is a function (called environment)
from free variables of φ to subsets of the states of M . The environment ρ[S′/Z](Y ) is
equal to ρ(Y ) if Y 6= Z, otherwise ρ[S′/Z](Z) = S′.
Equational µ-calculus Equational µ-calculus is based on fix-point equations instead
of fixpoint operators that permit to define recursively the properties of systems. A
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[[T ]]ρ = S
[[F ]]ρ = ∅
[[Z]]ρ = ρ(Z)
[[φ1 ∧ φ2]]ρ = [[φ1]]ρ ∩ [[φ2]]ρ
[[φ1 ∨ φ2]]ρ = [[φ1]]ρ ∪ [[φ2]]ρ
[[〈a〉φ]]ρ = {s|∃s′ : s a−→ s′ ands′ ∈ [[φ]]ρ}
[[[a]φ]]ρ = {s|∀s′ : s a−→ s′ impliess′ ∈ [[φ]]ρ}
[[µZ.φ]]ρ =
⋂{S′|[[φ]]ρ[S′/Z] ⊆ S′}
[[νZ.φ]]ρ =
⋃{S′|S′ ⊆ [[φ]]ρ[S′/Z]}
Table 2: Denotational semantics of modal µ-calculus.
minimal (maximal) fix-point equation is Z =µ φ (Z =ν φ), where φ is an assertion,
i.e. a simple modal formula without recursion operators.
Example 3.3 A lot of properties can be defined by using equational µ-calculus. In
particular it is useful to express several security properties. For instance it is possible
to find a formula to express safety property as, for instance, a formula that expresses
the possibility to open a new file only if the previous one is closed:
X =ν [τ ]X ∧ [open]Y
Y =ν [τ ]Y ∧ [close]X ∧ [open]F
. A liveness property (“something good happens”) like “a state satisfying φ can be
reached” is expressed by Z =µ 〈 〉Z ∨ φ1.
The syntax of the assertions (φ) and of the lists of equations (D) is given by the fol-
lowing grammar:
φ ::= Z | T | F | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | 〈a〉φ | [a]φ
D ::= Z =ν φD | Z =µ φD | ²
It is worthwhile noticing that the syntax of assertions is more restrictive w.r.t. the
one for modal µ-calculus. This is mainly due to our necessity to perform syntactic
transformations on these assertions. This syntax permits us to keep small the size of the
transformed assertions. It is assumed that variables appear only once on the left-hand
sides of the equations of the list, the set of these variables will be denoted as Def(D).
A list of equations is closed if every variable that appears in the assertions of the list
is in Def(D). Let M = 〈S,→〉 be an LTS, ρ be an environment that assigns subsets
of S to variables that appear in the assertions of D, but which are not in Def(D).
Then, the semantics JφKρ of an assertion φ is the same as for µ-calculus assertions
and the semantics JDKρ of a definition list is an environment which assigns subsets
of S to variables in Def(D). As notation, we use unionsq to represent union of disjoint
1In writing properties, here and in the rest of the paper, we use the shortcut notations [ ] means [Actτ ]
and, equivalently, 〈 〉 means 〈Actτ 〉.
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environments. Let σ be in {µ, ν}, σU.f(U) represents the σ fix-point of the function
f in one variable U . The semantics, JDKρ is defined by the following equations:
J²Kρ = [] J(Z =σ φ)DKρ = JDK(ρunionsq[U ′/Z]) unionsq [U ′/Z]
where U ′ = σU.JφK(ρunionsq[U/Z]unionsqρ′(U)) and ρ′(U) = JDK(ρunionsq[U/Z]).
It informally says that the solution to (Z =σ φ)D is the σ fix-point solution U ′ ofJφK where the solution to the rest of the list of equations D is used as environment. We
write M |= D ↓ Z as notation for JDK(Z) when the environment ρ is evident from
the context or D is a closed list (i.e. without free variables) and without propositional
constants; furthermore Z must be the first variable in the list D.
For both of these logics the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.1 ([44]) Given a formula φ it is possible to decide in exponential time in
the length of φ if there exists a model of φ and it is also possible to give an example of
such model.
Later in the paper we use the finitary axioms system proposed by Walukievicz in [47]
in order to synthesize controller program for given controller operator (Section 6).
3.2.1 Characteristic formula
A characteristic formula (see [34]) is a formula in equational µ-calculus that com-
pletely characterizes the behavior of a (state in a) state-transition graph modulo a cho-
sen notion of behavioral relation. It is possible to define the notion of characteristic
formula for a given finite state process E with respect different behavioral relation. In
this subsection we present the notion of characteristic formula for E w.r.t. simulation
and bisimulation relations.
Definition 3.3 Given a finite state process E, its characteristic formula (w.r.t. weak
bisimulation) DE ↓ ZE is defined by the following equations for every E′ ∈ Der(E),
a ∈ Act:
ZE′ =ν (
∧
a ∈ Actτ
E′ a−→ E′′
〈〈aˆ〉〉ZE′′) ∧ (
∧
a∈Actτ
([a](
∨
E′ aˆ=⇒E′′
ZE′′)))
where 〈〈a〉〉 of the modality 〈a〉 which can be introduce as abbreviation (see [34]):
〈〈²〉〉φ def= Z where Z =µ φ ∨ 〈τ〉Z
〈〈a〉〉φ def= 〈〈²〉〉〈a〉〈〈²〉〉φ
The following lemma characterizes the power of these formulae.
Lemma 3.1 Let E1 and E2 be two different finite-state processes. If φE2 is character-
istic for E2 then:
1. If E1 ≈ E2 then E1 |= φE2
11
2. If E1 |= φE2 and E1 is finite-state then E1 ≈ E2.
Now we consider weak simulation as behavioral relation and we define the character-
istic formula of a finite-state process E w.r.t. this relation as follows.
Definition 3.4 Given a finite state process E, its characteristic formula (w.r.t. weak
simulation) DE ↓ ZE is defined by the following equations: for every E′ ∈ Der(E),
ZE′ =ν
∧
a∈Actτ
([a](
∨
E′′:E′ aˆ⇒E′′
ZE′′))
Following the reasoning used in [34], the following proposition holds.
Lemma 3.2 Let E be a finite-state process and let φE,¹ be its characteristic formula
w.r.t. simulation, then F ¹ E ⇔ F |= φE,¹.
It is easy to note that the characteristic formula of a process w.r.t. simulation is weaker
than the formula defined in the Definition 3.3.
3.3 Partial model checking
The partial model checking mechanisms was introduced by Andersen in [2]. This tech-
nique relies upon compositional methods for proving properties of concurrent systems.
The intuitive idea underlying the partial model checking is the following: proving
that E1‖E2 satisfies φ is equivalent to prove that E2 satisfies a modified specification
φ//E1 , where //E1 is the partial evaluation function for the parallel composition op-
erator (see [2] or Table 3). Hence, the behavior of a component has been partially
evaluated and the requirements are changed in order to respect this evaluation. The
partial model checking function (also called partial evaluation) for the parallel operator
is given in Table 3.
In order to explain better how partial model checking function acts on a given
equational µ-calculus formula, we show the following example.
Example 3.4 Let [τ ]φ be the given formula and let E‖F a process. We want to eval-
uate the formula [τ ]φ w.r.t. the ‖ operator and the process E. The formula [τ ]φ//E is
satisfied by F if the following three condition hold:
• F performs an action τ going in a state F ′ and E‖F ′ satisfies φ; this is taken
into account by the formula [τ ](φ//E );
• E performs an action τ going in a state E′ and E′‖F satisfies φ, and this is
considered by the conjunction
∧
E
τ−→E′φ//E′ , where every formula φ//E′ takes into account the behavior of F
in composition with a τ successor of E;
• the τ action is due to the performing of two complementary actions by the two
processes. So for every a successor E′ of E there is a formula [a¯](φ//E′ ).
In [2], the following lemma is given.
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Parallel:
(D↓ Z)//t = (D//t)↓ Zt
²//t = ²
(Z =σ φD)//t = ((Zs =σ φ//s)s∈Der(E))(D)//t
Z//t = Zt
[a]φ//s = [a](φ//s) ∧∧
s
a−→s′ φ//s
′, if a 6= τ
φ1 ∧ φ2//s = (φ1//s) ∧ (φ2//s)
〈a〉φ//s = 〈a〉(φ//s) ∨∨
s
a−→s′ φ//s
′, if a 6= τ
φ1 ∨ φ2//s = (φ1//s) ∨ (φ2//s)
[τ ]φ//s = [τ ](φ//s) ∧∧
s
τ−→s′ φ//s
′ ∧∧
s
a−→s′ [a](φ //s′)〈τ〉φ//s = 〈τ〉(φ//s) ∨∨
s
τ−→s′ φ//s
′ ∨∨
s
a−→s′〈a¯〉(φ//s′)
T//s = T
F//s = F
Relabeling:
Z//[f ] = Z
(Z =σ φD)//[f ] = (Z =σ φ//[f ](D)//[f ])
〈a〉φ//[f ] = ∨b:f(b)=a〈b〉(φ//[f ])
[a]φ//[f ] =
∧
b:f(b)=a[b](φ//[f ])
φ1 ∧ φ2//[f ] = (φ1//[f ]) ∧ (φ2//[f ])
φ1 ∨ φ2//[f ] = (φ1//[f ]) ∨ (φ2//[f ])
T//[f ] = T
F//[f ] = F
Table 3: Partial evaluation function for parallel operator and relabeling operator.
Lemma 3.3 Given a process E‖F (where E is finite-state) and an equational specifi-
cation D ↓ Z we have:
E‖F |= (D ↓ Z) iff F |= (D ↓ X)//E
Remarkably, this function is exploited in [2] to perform model checking efficiently, i.e.
both E and F are specified. In our setting, the process F will be not specified.
It is important to note that a lemma similar to Lemma 3.3 holds for each CCS
operators. As a matter of fact in Table 3 we also recall the definition of the partial
model checking function for relabeling operators. For the other CCS operators see
[2].
4 Open system analysis for security analysis
In this section we recall the concept of open system that we use to study our systems in
order to guarantee that they are secure.
A system is open if it has some unspecified components. We want to make sure
that the system with an unspecified component works properly, e.g. fulfills a certain
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property. Thus, the intuitive idea underlying the verification of an open system is the
following:
An open system satisfies a property if and only if, whatever component is substituted
to the unspecified one, the whole system satisfies this property.
In the context of formal languages for the description of system behavior, an open
system may be simply regarded as a term of this language which may contain “holes”
(or placeholders). These are unspecified components. For instanceE‖( ) andE‖F‖( )
may be considered as open systems.
Example 4.1 We suppose to have a system S in which three processes E, F and P
work in parallel. In order to be sure that S works as we expected we have to consider
that a possible malicious agent works in parallel with E, F and P as we can see the
following figure:
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




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X
Specification : E‖F‖P‖X
X is a malicious agent
E
P
F
The main idea is that, when analyzing security-sensitive systems, neither the enemy’s
behavior nor the malicious users’ behavior should be fixed beforehand. A system
should be secure regardless of the behavior the malicious users or intruders may have,
which is exactly a verification problem of open systems. According to [27, 29], the
problem that we want to study can be formalized as follows:
For every component X S‖X |= φ (2)
where X stands for a possible enemy, S is the system under examination and φ is
a (temporal) logic formula expressing the security property. It roughly states that the
property φ holds for the system S, regardless of the component (i.e. intruder, malicious
user, hostile environment, etc.) which may possibly interact with it.
By using partial model checking we reduce such a verification problem as in For-
mula (2) to a validity checking problem as follows:
∀X S‖X |= φ iff X |= φ//S (3)
In this way we find the sufficient and necessary condition on X , expressed by the
logical formula φ//S , so the whole system S‖X satisfies φ if and only if X satisfies
φ//S .
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5 Process algebra controller operators
Using the open system approach we develop a theory to enforce security properties.
In order to protect the system we should check each process X before executing it. If
it is not possible, we have to find a way to guarantee that the whole system behaves
correctly. For that reason we develop process algebra controller operators that force
the intruder to behave correctly, i.e., referring to Formula (3), as prescribed by the
formula φ//S . We denote controller operators by Y . X , where X is an unspecified
component (target) and Y is a controller program. The controller program is a process
that controls X in order to guarantee that a given security property is satisfied.
Specification : S‖Y . X
X
Y
S
Y . X
Hence we use controller operator in such way the specification of the system be-
comes:
∃Y ∀X s.t. S‖(Y . X) |= φ (4)
By partially evaluating φ w.r.t. S the Formula (4) is reduced as follows:
∃Y ∀X Y . X |= φ′ (5)
where φ′ = φ//S .
It is important to note that, by using partial model checking we need to control only
the possible un-trusted component of the system. Our method allows one to monitor
only the necessary/untrusted part of the system, here X . We can define several kinds
of controller operators. Each of them has different capabilities. We deal with security
automata (truncation, suppression, insertion, edit) defined in [9, 10] by modeling them
by process algebra controller operators Y .KX , whereK ∈ {T, S, I, E}where T stays
for Truncation, S for Suppression, I for Insertion and E for Edit. In the next section
we just recall the semantics definition of security automata and we present how we
model them by process algebra operators giving the semantics of our process algebra
operators.
5.1 Modeling security automata with process algebra
Here we choose to follow the approach given by Ligatti and al. in [9] to describe the
behavior of security automata.
A security automaton at least consists of a (countable) set of states, say Q, a set of
actions Act and a transition (partial) function δ. Each kind of automata has a slightly
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different sort of transition function δ, and these differences account for the variations
in their expressive power. The exact specification of δ is part of the definition of each
kind of automaton. We use σ to denote a sequence of actions, · for the empty sequence
and τ 2 to represent an internal action.
The execution of each different kind of security automata K is specified by a la-
beled operational semantics. The basic single-step judgment has the form (σ, q) a−→K
(σ′, q′) where σ′ and q′ denote, respectively, the action sequence and the state after that
the automaton takes a single step, and a denotes the action produced by the automaton.
The single-step judgment can be generalized to a multi-step judgment (σ, q) γ=⇒K3
(σ′, q′), where γ is a sequence of actions, as follows.
(σ, q) .=⇒K (σ, q) (Reflex)
(σ, q) a−→K (σ′′, q′′) (σ′′, q′′) γ=⇒K (σ′, q′)
(σ, q)
a;γ
=⇒K (σ′, q′)
(Trans)
We define four controller operators by showing their behavior thought semantics rules.
We also prove for each of our operators that its behavior mimics the behavior of one of
the security automata. Hence in the following we recall the semantic definition of each
security automaton, we show the controller operator by which we model it and, finally,
we prove that they have the same behavior (for technical proofs see Appendix A).
Truncation automaton The operational semantics definition of truncation automata
given in [9, 10] is the following:
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′
(σ, q) a−→T (σ′, q′) (T-Step)
otherwise
(σ, q) τ−→T (·, q) (T-Stop)
We denote with E the controller program and with F the target. We work, without loss
of generality, under the additional assumption that E and F never perform the internal
action τ . We define the controller operators .T as follows:
E
a→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .T F
a→ E′ .T F ′
This operator models the truncation automaton that is similar to Schneider’s automaton
(when considering only deterministic automata, e.g., see [9, 10]). Its semantics rule
states that if F performs the action a and the same action is performed by E (so it
is allowed in the current state of the automaton), then E .T F performs the action a,
otherwise it halts.
2In [9] internal actions are denoted by ·. According to the standard notation of process algebras, we use
τ to denote an internal action.
3Consider a finite sequence of visible actions γ = a1 . . . an. Here we use ⇒ to denote automata
computations. Before we use the same notation for process algebra computations. The meaning of the
symbol will be clear from the context.
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Proposition 5.1 Let Eq =
∑
a∈Act
{
a.Eq
′ iff δ(a, q) = q′
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of a truncation automaton (Q, q0, δ) is also derivable from Eq .T F and vice-
versa.
Suppression automaton Referring to [9], it is defined as
(Q, q0, δ, ω) where ω : Actτ × Q → {−,+} indicates whether or not the action in
question should be suppressed (-) or emitted (+).
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
(σ, q) a−→S (σ′, q′) (S-StepA)
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
(σ, q) τ−→S (σ′, q′) (S-StepS)
otherwise
(σ, q) τ−→S (·, q) (S-Stop)
We denote with E the controller program and with F the target. We work, without loss
of generality, under the additional assumption that E and F never perform the internal
action τ . We define the controller operators .S as follows:
E
a→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .S F
a→ E′ .S F ′
E
−a−→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .S F
τ→ E′ .S F ′
where−a is a control action not in Actτ (so it does not admit a complementary action).
As for the truncation automaton, if F performs the same action performed by E also
E.S F performs it. On the contrary, if F performs an action a that E does not perform
and E can perform the control action −a then E .S F performs the action τ that sup-
presses the action a, i.e., a becomes not visible from external observation. Otherwise,
E .S F halts.
Proposition 5.2 Let Eq,ω =
∑
a∈Act
 a.E
q′,ω iff ω(a, q) = + and δ(a, q) = q′
−a.Eq′,ω iff ω(a, q) = − and δ(a, q) = q′
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of a suppression automaton (Q, q0, δ, ω) is also derivable from Eq,ω .S F and
vice-versa.
Insertion automata Referring to [9], it is defined as
(Q, q0, δ, γ) where γ : Actτ × Q → Actτ × Q that specifies the insertion of an
action into the sequence of actions of the program. It is necessary to note that in
[9, 10] the automaton inserts a finite sequence of actions instead of only one action,
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i.e., using the function γ, it controls if a wrong action is performed. If it happens, the
automaton inserts a finite sequence of actions, hence a finite number of intermediate
states. Without loss of generality, we consider that it performs only one action. In this
way we openly consider all intermediate states. Note that the domain of γ is disjoint
from the domain of δ in order to have a deterministic automata.
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′
(σ, q) a−→I (σ′, q′) (I-Step)
if σ = a;σ′ and γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
(σ, q) b−→I (σ, q′) (I-Ins)
otherwise
(σ, q) τ−→I (·, q) (I-Stop)
We denote with E the controller program and with F the target. We work, without loss
of generality, under the additional assumption that E and F never perform the internal
action τ . We define the controller operators .I as follows:
E
a→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .I F
a→ E′ .I F ′
E 6 a→ E′ E +a.b−→ E′ F a→ F ′
E .I F
b→ E′ .I F
where +a is an action not in Actτ . If F performs an action a that also E can perform,
the whole system makes this action. If F performs an action a that E does not per-
form and E detects it by performing a control action +a followed by an actio b, then
the whole system perform b. It is possible to note that in the description of insertion
automata in [9] the domains of γ and δ are disjoint. In our case, this is guarantee by
the premise of the second rule in which we have that E 6 a−→ E′, E +a.b−→ E′. In fact for
the insertion automata, if a pair (a, q) is not in the domain of δ and it is in the domain
of γ it means that if we are in the state q we cannot perform a actions so in order to
change state an action different from a must be performed. It is important to note that
it is able to insert new actions but it is not able to suppress any action performed by F .
Proposition 5.3 Let Eq,γ =
∑
a∈Act\{τ}
 a.E
q′,γ iff δ(a, q)
+a.b.Eq
′,γ iff γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of an insertion automaton (Q, q0, δ, γ) is also derivable from Eq,γ .I F and
vice-versa.
Edit automata According to [9], it is defined as (Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) where γ : Actτ ×
Q → Actτ × Q that specifies the insertion of a finite sequence of actions into the
program’s actions sequence and ω : Actτ ×Q → {−,+} indicates whether or not the
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action in question should be suppressed (-) or emitted (+). Also here ω and δ have the
same domain while the domain of γ is disjoint from the domain of δ in order to have a
deterministic automata.
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
(σ, q) a−→E (σ′, q′) (E-StepA)
if σ = a;σ′ and δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
(σ, q) τ−→E (σ′, q′) (E-StepS)
if σ = a;σ′ and γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
(σ, q) b−→E (σ, q′) (E-Ins)
otherwise
(σ, q) τ−→E (·, q) (E-Stop)
We denote with E the controller program and with F the target. We work, without loss
of generality, under the additional assumption that E and F never perform the internal
action τ . In order to do insertion and suppression together we define the following
controller operator .E . Its rules are the union of the rules of the .S and .I .
E
a→E′ F a→F ′
E.EF
a→E′.EF ′
E
−a−→E′ F a→F ′
E.EF
τ→E′.EF ′
E 6 a→E′ E+a.b−→E′ F a−→F ′
E.EF
b−→E′.EF
This operator combines the power of the previous two ones.
Proposition 5.4 Let Eq,γ,ω =
∑
a∈Act

a.Eq
′,γ,ω iff δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
−a.Eq′,γ,ω iff δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
+a.b.Eq
′,γ,ω iff γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of an edit automaton (Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) is also derivable from Eq,γ,ω .E F and
vice-versa.
It is important to note that we introduced the control action −a in the semantics of .S
and +a in the semantics of .I in order to find operators that were as similar as possible
to suppression and insertion automata, respectively.
6 Synthesis of controller program
One of the goals of our work is to find a controller program Y that can secure a given
system whatever is X . In particular we wonder if there exists an implementation of Y
that can be plugged into the system that guarantees the system is secure.
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According to the previous section we can enforce safety properties in several ways.
As a matter of fact we have described four different controller operators: Y .T X ,
Y .S X , Y .I X and Y .E X . For each of them we want to solve the following
problem:
∃Y ∀X Y .K X |= φ′
where K is in {T, S, I, E} and φ′ is an equational µ-calculus formula as in Formula
(5).
For that reason we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1 For every K ∈ {T, S, I, E} Y .K X ¹ Y [fK] holds, where fK is a
relabeling function depending on K. In particular, fT is the identity function on Actτ 4
and
fS(a) =
{
τ if a = −a
a othw fI(a) =
{
τ if a = +a
a othw
fE(a) =
{
τ if a ∈ {+a,−a}
a othw
These operators are applied in order to enforce safety properties. Hence we restrict
ourselves to a subclass of equational µ-calculus formulae that is denoted by Frµ. This
class consists of equational µ-calculus formulae without 〈 〉. It is easy to prove that this
set of formulae is closed under the partial model checking function and the following
result holds.
Proposition 6.2 Let E and F be two finite state processes and φ ∈ Frµ. If F ¹ E
then E |= φ⇒ F |= φ.
At this point in order to satisfy the Formula (5) it is sufficient to find a controller
program s.t.:
Y [fK] |= φ′
To further reduce the previous formula, we can use the partial model checking function
for relabeling operator. Hence, for everyK ∈ {T, S, I, E} we calculate φ′′K = φ′//[fK] .
Thus we obtain:
∃Y Y |= φ′′K (6)
This is a satisfiability problem in µ-calculus that can be solved by Theorem 3.1. It
is important to note that even if the process Y performs some actions τ it is possible
to obtain from Y another process Y ′ with only visible actions that is a deterministic
model of φ.
6.1 A tool for the Synthesis of Controller Programs
In order to solve the satisfiability problem described by the Formula (6) we have de-
veloped a tool that, given a system S and a formula φ, generates a process Y . This
process is a model for φ′, the formula obtained by the partial evaluation of φ by S and,
moreover, it guarantees that S‖(Y . X) satisfies φ whatever X is.
4Here the set Actτ must be consider enriched by control actions.
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−controllers.ml
MuDiv
b) A zoom of the Synthesis module
a) The architecture of the whole tool
Translator
−calc.ml
−fparser.ml
−flexer.ml
Synthesis
−convert.ml
−types_for.ml
−goodgraph.ml
−model.ml
−simplify.ml
−main.ml
−printGraph.ml
Synthesis
φ′ = φ//S Y
Y
φ, S
φ′ = φ//S
φ′mod
Figure 1: Architecture of the tool.
The tool is made up of two main parts (see Figure 1.a)): the first part implements
the partial model checking function; the second one, by implementing the satisfiability
procedure developed by Walukiewicz in [47], generates a process Y . In particular, it
permit to obtain a controller program Y for each controller operators .K.
In Figure 1 there is a graphical representation of the architecture of the whole tool
that we explain in more detail in the following section.
6.1.1 Architecture of the tool
The first module of our tool consists in the MuDiv module. It implements the partial
model checking function. It has been developed in C++ by J.B. Nielsen and H.R. An-
dersen. The MuDiv takes in input a process S described by an LTS and an equational
µ-calculus formula φ and returns an equational µ-calculus formula φ′ = φ//S .
The second module of our tool is the Synthesis module. It is able to build a model
for a given modal µ-calculus formula by exploiting the satisfiability procedure devel-
oped by Walukiewicz in [47]. It is developed in O’caml 3.09 (see [24]) and it is de-
scribed better in Figure 1.b) in which we can see that it consists of two submodules:
the Translator and the Synthesis.
The Translator manages the formula φ′, output of the MuDiv module in order to
obtain a formula that can be manage from the Synthesis module. It “translates” φ′ from
an equational to a modal µ-calculus formula. This translation is necessary because the
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Walukiewicz’s satisfiability procedure was developed for modal µ-calculus formulae
instead the partial model checking was developed for equational µ-calculus ones. As
a matter of fact, the equational µ-calculus is close for partial model checking. This
means that applying the partial model checking function to an equational µ-calculus
formula we obtain an equational µ-calculus formula.
The Translator consists in four functions: fparser.ml and flexer.ml that
permit to read the MuDiv output file and analyze it as input sequence in order to deter-
mine its grammatical structure with respect to our grammar. The function calc.ml
calls flexer.ml and fparser.ml on a specified file. In this way we obtain
an equational µ-calculus formula φ′ according to the type that we have defined in
type for.ml. The last function, convert.ml, translates the equational µ-calculus
formula φ′ in the modal one φ′mod.
The Synthesis is an implementation of Walukiewicz satisfiability procedure. Given a
modal µ-calculus formula φ′mod we build a graph by following the set of axioms of the
satisfiability procedure of Walukiewicz. For that reason we define the type graph
as a list of triple (n, a, n) ∈ GNode × Actτ × GNode where GNode is the set of
graph nodes. Each node of the graph represents a state L(n) of the graph. Each node
is characterized by the set of formulae that it satisfies.
The kind of formulae that we consider are formulae that express safety properties,
i.e. they are modal µ-calculus formulae without minimum fixpoint and diamond oper-
ators.
In model.ml we build the entire graph for the given formula φ′mod. It takes as
input a pair in GNode×Graph and, in a recursive way, builds the graph. Referring to
[47] we have to check if the graph that we build is effectively a model or a refutation
of φ′mod. We do this by the function goodgraph.ml. This function takes in input a
graph and gives back the boolean value TRUE if the graph is a model, FALSE otherwise
and it halts. These two functions, model.ml and goodgraph.ml, work in pair in
order to find a graph in which φ′mod is satisfied. At the beginning we give in input a
node labeled by φ and Empty Graph, that represents the empty graph. Then, in a
recursive way, we build the graph by checking it at each step by goodgraph.ml. It
is important to note that the graph that we generate has some transition that are labeled
by an action and some transition that come from the semantics of logical operations.
If we are able to build the entire graph we use the function simplify.ml to extract
exactly the process that is a model for φ′mod. Such process consists in the graph in
which all nodes that are linked by logical operation are considered as a single node.
In this way at the end we obtain a labeled transition system that represents a process.
Such process is a model for φ′mod.
In order to synthesize a process Y that is a model of φ′mod as well as a con-
troller program for a chosen controller operators, we have implemented the function
controllers.ml. By using this function we relabel Y according with the con-
troller operator we want to use as it is prescribed by Proposition 6.1. In this way we
obtain four different processes Y = Y [fT ], because fT is the identity function on
Actτ , Y [fS ], Y [fI ] and Y [fE ].
Other function in this submodule are the function
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printGraph.ml that permits to print the graph as a sequence of nodes labeled by a
list of formulae, connected by arrows labeled by an action, and the function main.ml
that calls all the other functions and permits to create the executable file (.exe).
7 A Cases Study
In order to explain better how the tool works, we present an example in which a system
must satisfy a safety property. We generate a controller program for each of the four
controllers defined in Section 5.1.
Let S be a system. We suppose that all users that work on S have to satisfy the
following rule:
You cannot open a new file while another file is open.
It can be formalized by an equation system D as follows:
X =ν [τ ]X ∧ [open]Y
Y =ν [τ ]Y ∧ [close]X ∧ [open]F
7.1 Truncation
We halt the system if the user try to open a file while another is already open. In this
case we generate a controller program Y for Y .T X and we obtain:
Y = open.close.Y
Y is a model for D.
In order to show how it works as controller program for Y .TX we suppose to have
a possible user X that tries to open two different files. Hence X = open.open.0.
Applying Y .T X we obtain:
Y .T X =
open.close.Y .T open.open.0
open−→ close.Y .T
open.0
Since Y and X are going to perform a different action, i.e. Y is going to perform
close while X is going to perform open, the whole system halts.
7.2 Suppression
We suppose to decide to suppress any possible open action that can violate the prop-
erty D. In this case we generate a controller program Y for the controller Y .S X . We
obtain:
Y = −open.Y + open.Y ′
Y ′ = −open.Y ′ + close.Y
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Let we suppose to be in the same scenario described for the previous operator. Let X
be a user that tries to open two different files. Hence X = open.open.0. Applying
Y .S X we obtain:
Y .S X = −open.Y + open.Y ′ .S open.open.0
open−→ −open.Y ′ + close.Y .S open.0 τ−→ Y ′ .S 0
The whole system halts again because, even if a wrong action is suppressed, this con-
trollers cannot introduce right actions.
7.3 Insertion
Let Y be a controller program for the controller Y .I X . We obtain:
Y = +open.close.open.Y + open.Y ′
Y ′ = +open.close.open.Y ′ + close.Y
We consider X that tries to open two different files. Hence X = open.open.0. We
obtain:
Y .I X =
+open.close.open.Y + open.Y ′ .I open.open.0
open−→ +open.close.open.Y ′ + close.Y .I open.0
close−→ open.Y ′ .I open.0 open−→ Y ′ .I 0
We can note the Y permits X to perform the first action open. Then it checks that
X is going to perform another open by the action +open. Hence Y insert an action
close. After this action it permits X to perform the action open. Since X does not
perform any another actions the whole system halts.
7.4 Edit
We consider to apply the controller operator Y .E X . The controller program that we
generate is the following:
Y = −open.Y + +open.close.open.Y + open.Y ′
Y ′ = −open.Y ′ + +open.close.open.Y ′ + close.Y
We suppose again that X = open.open.0. We have:
Y .E X =
−open.Y + +open.close.open.Y + open.Y ′.E
.Eopen.open.0
open−→
−open.Y ′ + +open.close.open.Y ′ + close.Y .E
.Eopen.0
close−→ open.Y ′ .E .Eopen.0 open−→ Y ′ .E 0
Also in this case, after the first action open, Y checks if X is going to perform another
open by the action +open and then it inserts the action close in order to satisfy the
property D. Then it permit to perform another open action.
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8 Further results
8.1 Timed setting
In this section we extend to a timed setting the theory that we have previously devel-
oped. First of all we show some notions useful to describe a very simple timed setting.
8.1.1 GSOS and CCS process algebra with time
We follow a simple approach, where time is discrete, actions are durationless and there
is one special tick action to represent the elapsing of time (see [37]). These are fea-
tures of the so called fictitious clock approach of, e.g. [14, 21, 45]. A global clock
is supposed to be updated whenever all the processes of the system agree on this, by
globally synchronizing on action tick. Hence, between the two global synchronization
on action tick all the processes proceed asynchronously by performing durationless
actions. So, the tick action is important in parallel operator whose semantics, in this
case, is enriched of this one more rule in addition of rules given in Table 1.
E1
tick−→ E′1 E2 tick−→ E′2
E1‖E2 tick−→ E′1‖E′2
8.1.2 Behavioral equivalence
As done in [37] we consider the class of processes that do allow time proceed, the so-
called weakly time alive processes. These represent correct attackers w.r.t. time. (As a
matter of fact, it is not realistic that an intruder or a malicious agent can block the flow
of time.)
Definition 8.1 A processE is directly weakly time alive iffE tick=⇒ 5, while it is weakly
time alive iff for all E′ ∈ Der(E), we have E′ is directly weakly time alive.
Since E α−→ E′ implies Der(E′) ⊆ Der(E), it directly follows that if E is weakly
time alive, then any derived E′ of E is weakly time alive as well. Moreover, it is
worthwhile noticing that the above property is preserved by the parallel composition.
The behavioral relation considered here is the timed versions of weak bisimulation
[33]. This equivalence permits to abstract to some extent from the internal behavior of
the systems, represented by the invisible τ actions.
Definition 8.2 Let (E , T ) be an LTS of concurrent processes, and let R be a binary
relation over E . Then R is called timed weak simulation, denoted by ¹t, over (E , T )
if and only if, whenever (E,F ) ∈ R we have:
• if E a−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F a=⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R,
• if E tick−→ E′ then there exists F ′ s.t. F tick=⇒ F ′ and (E′, F ′) ∈ R.
5This means that we are no interested to the final state of the transition.
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Moreover, a binary relation R over E is said a timed weak bisimulation (denoted by
≈t) over the LTS of concurrent processes (E , T ) if both R and its converse are timed
weak simulation.
8.1.3 Partial model checking with time
Introducing the new tick action we have one more case to consider in the definition
of partial model checking function. The tick action cannot be consider as the other
actions in Actτ . Hence we extend the partial model checking function to deal with
time by adding the following rules
〈tick〉A//s =
{
〈tick〉A//s′ s tick−→ s′
F otw
[tick]A//s =
{
[tick]A//s′ s tick−→ s′
T otw
It is easy to note that the insertion of tick action affects only the partial model checking
for parallel operator.
8.1.4 Our controller operators in a timed setting
In this section we study how the controller operators that we have defined in Section
5.1 work in a timed setting. We want that Y .K X , for each K, are processes that
do allow time to proceed, so we prove that it is weakly time alive. Here we use the
following notation: E and F are finite state processes. E is the controller program and
F the target. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 8.1 If both E and F are weakly time alive, also E .K F is weakly time
alive.
Dealing with time does not change or modify the semantic of our controllers. Hence a
proposition similar to Proposition 6.1 holds. In particular, looking at the definition of
weak timed simulation and at the proof of the Proposition 6.1, given in appendix, the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 8.2 For every K ∈ {truncation, suppression, insertion, edit} the follow-
ing relation holds E .K F ¹t E[fK] where fK is a relabeling function definition of
which depend on K.
We can then recast results of the previous section in a timed setting.
8.2 Parameterized Systems
A parameterized system describes an infinite family of (typically finite-state) systems;
instances of the family can be obtained by fixing parameters. Consider a parameterized
system S = Pn defined by parallel composition of processes P , e.g. P‖P‖ . . . ‖P︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. The
parameter n represents the number of processes P present in the system S.
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Example 8.1 Consider the system with one consumer process C and n producer pro-
cesses P . Each process P is defined P def= a.P where a ∈ Act, and the process C
is a¯.C. The entire system is (Pn‖C)\{a} and the processes communicate by synchro-
nization on a¯ and a actions.
Referring to the Formula (2) we have
∀n ∀X Pn‖X |= φ (7)
It is possible to note that in the previous equation there are two universal quantifica-
tions; the first one on the number of instances of the process P and the second one on
the possible unknown agents.
In order to eliminate the universal quantification on the number of processes, first
of all, we define the concept of invariant formula w.r.t. partial model checking for
parallel operator as follows.
Definition 8.3 A formula φ is said an invariant w.r.t. partial model checking for the
system P‖X iff φ⇔ φ//P .
It is possible to prove the following result.
Proposition 8.3 Given the system ∀i Pi‖X . If φ is an invariant formula for this system
then
∀X (∀n Pn‖X |= φ iff X |= φ)
In order to apply the theory developed in Section 4, we show a method to find the
invariant formula. According to [8], let ψi be defined as follows
ψi =
{
φ′1 if i = 1
ψi−1 ∧ φ′i if i > 1
By definition of ψi and by Lemma 3.3, ∀j s.t. 1 ≤ j ≤ i (X |= φ′j) ⇔ X |= ψi.
Hence X |= ψi means that ∀j s.t. 1 ≤ j ≤ i Pj‖X |= φ′. We say that ψi is said to
be contracting if ψi ⇒ ψi−1. If ∀i ψi ⇒ ψi−1 holds, we have a chain that is a said
a contracting sequence. If it is possible to find the invariant formula ψω for a chain of
µ-calculus formulae, that is also said limit of the sequence, then the following identity
holds.
∀X (X |= ψω ⇔ ∀n ≥ 1 Pn‖X |= φ′) (8)
Now we can apply the reasoning made in Section 4. Hence we are able to de-
fine a controller operator that forces each process to behave correctly and synthesize a
controller program.
In some cases it could not be possible to find the limit of the chain. However there
are some technique that can be useful in order to find an approximation of this limit
(see [8, 15]).
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8.3 Composition of safety properties
Our logical approach is able to struggle successfully with composition problems by
using the operator .T . We suppose to have to force a systems to satisfy a security
policy that can be write as the conjunction of several safety properties as follows:
∀X S‖X |= φ = φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn (9)
where φ1 . . . φn are safety properties simpler than φ. In order to guarantee that the
whole system satisfy φ we have to find a controller program Y for a given controller
operator that force φ to be satisfied. So we want to find Y s.t.:
∀X S‖Y .T X |= φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn (10)
According to Theorem 3.1, the cost of the satisfiability procedure is exponential in
the size of the formula. What we prove here is a method to find a controller program
Y for φ starting from controller operators for safety formula simpler than φ. To do this
we split φ in a finite number n of sub-formulae, whenever it is possible, φ1, . . . , φn,
s.t. φ =
∧n
i=1 φi. Then, by exploiting he Theorem 3.1, we synthesize a controller
program Yi for each of φi formula. Finally, by composing Yi one to each other we
obtain Y . This method is less expensive than synthesize directly Y . As a matter of
fact, synthesize Y is exponential in the size of φ. Let we consider that all the φi have
the same size m and let the cost of the composition be constant. Then the cost of our
method is nO(2m) instead of O(2m×n).
In order to describe our method, first of all, we rewrite Formula (9), by exploiting
the semantics definition of the logical conjunction, as follows:
∀X S‖X |= φ1 and
∀X S‖X |= φ2 and
. . .
∀X S‖X |= φn
By partial model checking we obtain:
∀X X |= φ′1 and
∀X X |= φ′2 and
. . .
∀X X |= φ′n
where for each i from 1 to n, φ′i = (φi)//S .
Let Y1, . . . , Yn be n processes such that:
∀X Y1 .T X |= φ′1 and
∀X Y2 .T X |= φ′2 and
. . .
∀X Yn .T X |= φ′n
It is possible to prove the following result.
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Lemma 8.1 Let φ be a safety property, conjunction of n safety properties, i.e. φ =
φ1∧φ2∧. . .∧φn where φ1, . . . φn are safety properties. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be n controller
programs s.t. ∀i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ n Yi |= φi. We have
∀X Yn .T (Yn−1 .T (. . . .T (Y2 .T (Y1 .T X)))) |= φ
This means that, if we have several controller programs for several safety properties,
applying them one after the other we can enforce a safety property that is the conjunc-
tion of the previous ones. However, in this way, we apply the procedure for enforcing
n times. Instead we want apply it only one time to force that conjunction of formulae.
For that reason we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 8.4 Let we consider the controller operator .T . It is possible to find
Y1, . . . , Yn controller programs s.t. if Y1 .T X |= φ′1, . . . , Yn .T X |= φn then
(Y1 .T . . . .T Yn) .T X |= φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn.
Hence, referring to the Formula 10, in order to find Y we find Y1, . . . , Yn that enforce
φ′1, . . . , φ
′
n respectively and we compose them as in Proposition 8.4. In this way we
find Y that force φ′ = φ′1 ∧ . . . ∧ φ′n. According to Lemma 3.3 we have:
∀X Y .T X |= φ′
m
∀X S‖Y .T X |= φ
Hence we obtain a controller program Y for φ.
It is important to note that the Proposition 8.4 holds only for the operator .T be-
cause, as it is possible to see from the proof in Appendix A, it is necessary that both
processes, the controller and the target, agree on the action are going to perform. Look-
ing to the operational semantics of controller operators, it is easy to see that the operator
.T is the only one that satisfies this requirement.
9 Conclusion
We illustrated some results towards a uniform theory for enforcing security properties.
With this work, we extended a framework based on process calculi and logical tech-
niques, that have been shown to be very suitable to model and verify several security
properties, to tackle also synthesis problems of secure systems. In particular we have
shown how security properties can be conveniently specified and verified in a uniform
way by using a few concepts of concurrency and temporal logic theory, as, for instance,
partial model checking. Using the same framework we also deal with the synthesis of
secure systems.
Moreover we have described a tool for the synthesis of a controller program based
on Walukiewicz’s satisfiability procedure as well as on the partial model checking tech-
nique. In particular, starting from a system S and a formula φ that describes a security
property, the tool generates a process that, by monitoring a possible un-trusted compo-
nent, guarantees that a system S‖X satisfies φ whatever X is.
We also deal with the synthesis of secure systems in a timed setting and for param-
eterized systems. We present also a method to enforce composition of policies.
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A Technical proofs
Lemma 3.2 Let E be a finite-state process and let φE,¹ be its characteristic formula
w.r.t. weak simulation.
F ¹ E ⇔ F |= φE,¹
Proof: In order to prove the following proposition we give the following chain:
F ¹ E ⇔ ∀α F α→ F ′ ∃E′ E α⇒ E′ ∧ F ′ ¹ E′ ⇔
∀α F α→ F ′ F ′ |= ∨XE′ ⇔ ∀α F |= [α](∨XE′)⇔
F |= ∧([α](∨XE′))
In order to guarantee homogeneity of notation, we assume to work with an LTS,
since that both automata and sequential process are LTS (see [33]). We should give a
proof that a bisimulation exists between automata and controller operator so they have
the same behavior.
Before starting to prove Propositions 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, we note that in our controller
operators the halt condition is not roundly given because this occurs when there are not
rule that could be applied, i.e., when premises of all rules are not verify. As we have
already note, also in security automata described in Section 5.1, the action τ in stop rule
of each automata is an internal action that is not really performed. So in our proofs,
without loss of validity, we can omit the stop case because, looking at the semantics of
each operator, it is easy to understand that the stop rule of each automata is equivalent
to the halt condition of respectively operator.
Proposition 5.1 Let Eq =
∑
a∈Act
{
a.Eq
′ iff δ(a, q) = q′
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an output
of a truncation automaton (Q, q0, δ) is also derivable from Eq .T F and vice-versa.
Proof: We can define the relation of strong bisimulation RT in the following way:
RT = {((σ, q), Eq .T F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q,F σ7→}
Assume that (σ, q) a−→T (σ′, q′). For the semantic rule of .T , if Eq a−→ Eq′ and
F
a−→ F ′ perform the action a also Eq .T F a−→ Eq′ .T F ′ and F ′ σ
′
7→. Now assume
that Eq .T F
a−→ Eq′ .T F ′ and F ′ σ
′
7→. We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t.
(σ, q) a−→T (σ, q)′ and (Eq′ .T F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RT . For the rule T-Step, (σ, q) a−→T
(σ′, q′). So the couple that we are looking for is (σ′, q′).
Proposition 5.2 Let Eq,ω =
∑
a∈Act
 a.E
q′,ω iff ω(a, q) = + and δ(a, q) = q′
−a.Eq′,ω iff ω(a, q) = − and δ(a, q) = q′
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an
output of a suppression automaton (Q, q0, δ, ω) is also derivable from Eq,ω .S F and
vice-versa.
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Proof: The scheme of the proof and the notation are the same of the previous one.
Let
RS = {((σ, q), Eq,ω .S F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q,F σ7→}
be the strong bisimulation relation. We have two cases: the first one is similar of
proposition 5.1 in fact, let ((σ, q), Eq,ω .S F ) be in RS and (σ, q) a−→S (σ′, q′).
We should prove that exists a (Eq,ω .S F )′ s.t. Eq,ω .S F
a−→ (Eq,ω .S F )′ and
((σ′, q′), (Eq,ω .S F )′) ∈ RS . By the first rule of .S and by definition of Eq,ω , using a
similar reason of the proof of proposition 5.1, we trivially have the thesis. On the other
hand, let (Eq,ω .S F, (σ, q)) be in RS and Eq,ω .S F a−→ Eq′,ω .S F ′. We should
prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) a−→S (σ, q)′ and (Eq′,ω .S F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RS . For
the rule S-StepA we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution we are looking for. The reasoning
is similar to the previous one.
Now, let ((σ, q), Eq,ω .S F ) be in RS and (σ, q) τ−→S (σ′, q′). We should prove
that exists a (Eq,ω .S F )′ s.t. Eq,ω .S F
τ−→ (Eq,ω .S F )′ and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,ω .S
F )′) ∈ RS . We have, by the second rule of .S and by the definition of Eq,ω , that
if Eq,ω −a−→ Eq′,ω and F a−→ F ′ then Eq,ω .S F τ−→ Eq′,ω .S F ′. We have also
F ′ σ7→′.So ((σ′, q′), Eq′,ω .S F ′) ∈ RS trivially.
Now assume that (Eq,ω .S F, (σ, q)) be inRS and Eq,ω .S F τ−→ Eq′,ω .S F ′. We
should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) τ−→S (σ, q)′ and (Eq′,ω.SF ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RS
For the rule S-StepS we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution we are looking for. The
reasoning is similar to the previous one.
Proposition 5.3Let Eq,γ =
∑
a∈Act
 a.E
q′,γ iff δ(a, q)
+a.b.Eq
′,γ iff γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an output
of an insertion automaton (Q, q0, δ, γ) is also derivable from Eq,γ .I F and vice-versa.
Proof: The scheme of the proof and the notation are the same of the previous
one.Let RI be the strong bisimulation relation defined as follows:
RI = {((σ, q), Eq,γ .I F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q,F σ7→}
We have two cases: the first one is similar of proposition 5.1 in fact, let ((σ, q), Eq,γ .I
F ) be in RI and (σ, q) a−→I (σ′, q′). We should prove that exists a (Eq,γ .I F )′ s.t.
Eq,γ .I F
a−→ (Eq,γ .I F )′ and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,γ .I F )′) ∈ RI . By the first rule of
.I and by definition of Eq,γ ,using a similar reasoning of the proof of proposition 5.1,
we trivially have the thesis. On the other hand, let (Eq,γ .I F, (σ, q)) be in RI and
Eq,γ .I F
a−→ Eq′,γ .I F ′. We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) a−→I (σ, q)′
and (Eq′,γ .I F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RI . For the rule I-Step we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution
we are looking for. The reasoning is similar to the previous one.
Now let ((σ, q), Eq,γ .I F ) be in RI and (σ, q) b−→I (σ, q′). We should prove that
exists a (Eq,γ .I F )′ s.t. Eq,γ .I F
b−→ (Eq,γ .I F )′ and ((σ, q′), (Eq,γ .I F )′) ∈ RI .
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We have, by second rule of .I and by to the definition of Eq,γ , that if Eq,γ 6 a−→ Eq′,γ ,
Eq,γ
+a.b−→ Eq′,γ and F a−→ F ′ then Eq,γ .I F b−→ Eq′,γ .I F . So (Eq,γ .I F )′ is
Eq
′,γ .I F and ((σ, q′), Eq
′,γ .I F ) ∈ RI trivially.
Now, let (Eq,γ .I F, (σ, q)) be in RI and Eq,γ .I F b−→ Eq′,γ .I F . We should
prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t. (σ, q) b−→ (σ, q)′ and (Eq′,γ .I F, (σ, q)′) ∈ RI . For
the rule I-Ins we have that (σ, q′) is the solution we are looking for. The reasoning is
similar to the previous one.
Proposition 5.4Let Eq,γ,ω =
∑
a∈Act

a.Eq
′,γ,ω iff δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = +
−a.Eq′,γ,ω iff δ(a, q) = q′ and ω(a, q) = −
+a.b.Eq
′,γ,ω iff γ(a, q) = (b, q′)
0 othw
be the control process and let F be the target. Each sequence of actions that is an output
of an edit automaton (Q, q0, δ, γ, ω) is also derivable from Eq,γ,ω .E F and vice-versa.
Proof: In order to prove this lemma, we give the relation of bisimulationRE which
exists between edit automata and the controller operator .E as follows:
RE = {((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) : (σ, q) ∈ −→Act×Q,Eq,γ,ω .E F ∈ P,
F
σ7→}
We have three cases ad their proof following the reasoning made in the proof of lemma
5.2 and lemma 5.3. In fact:
• – Let ((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) be in RE and (σ, q) a−→E (σ′, q′). We should
prove that exists a (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ s.t. Eq,γ,ω .E F
a−→E (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′
and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′) ∈ RE . We have, by the first rule of .E
and by definition of Eq,γ,ω , that if Eq,γ,ω a−→E Eq′,γ,ω and F a−→ F ′
then Eq,γ,ω .E F
a−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′. Now F ′ σ7→
′
. So (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ is
Eq
′,γ,ω .E F
′ and ((σ′, q′), Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′) ∈ RE trivially.
– Let (Eq,γ,ω .E F, (σ, q)) be in RE and Eq,γ,ω .E F a−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′.
We should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t.
(σ, q) a−→ (σ, q)′ and (Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RE . For the rule E-StepA
we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution we are looking for. The reasoning is
similar to the previous one.
• – Let ((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) be in RE and (σ, q) τ−→E (σ′, q′). We should
prove that exists a (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ s.t. Eq,γ,ω .E F
τ−→ (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′
and ((σ′, q′), (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′) ∈ RE . We have, by second rule of .E and
by the definition of Eq,γ,ω , that if Eq,γ,ω −a−→ Eq′,γ,ω and F a−→ F ′ then
Eq,γ,ω .E F
τ−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′. Now F ′ σ7→
′
. So (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ is
Eq
′,γ,ω .E F
′ and ((σ′, q′), Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′) ∈ RE trivially.
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– Let (Eq,γ,ω .E F, (σ, q)) be in RE and Eq,ω .E F τ−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F ′. We
should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t.
(σ, q) τ−→e (σ, q)′ and (Eq,γ,ω .E F ′, (σ, q)′) ∈ RE For the rule E-StepS
we have that (σ′, q′) is the solution we are looking for. The reasoning is
similar to the previous one.
• – Let ((σ, q), Eq,γ,ω .E F ) be in RE and (σ, q) b−→E (σ, q′). We should
prove that exists a (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ s.t. Eq,γ,ω .E F
b−→ (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′
and ((σ, q′), (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′) ∈ RE . We have, by third rule of .E and by
the definition of Eq,γ,ω that if Eq,γ,ω 6 a−→ Eq′,γ,ω , Eq,γ,ω +a.b−→ Eq′,γ,ω
and F a−→ F ′ then Eq,γ,ω .E F b−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F . So (Eq,γ,ω .E F )′ is
Eq
′,γ,ω .E F and ((σ, q′), Eq
′,γ,ω .E F ) ∈ RE trivially.
– Let (Eq,γ,ω .E F, (σ, q)) be inRE and Eq,γ,ω .E F b−→ Eq′,γ,ω .E F . We
should prove that exists a (σ, q)′ s.t.
(σ, q) b−→ (σ, q)′ and (Eq′,γ .E F, (σ, q)′) ∈ RE . For the rule E-Ins we
have that (σ, q′) is the solution we are looking for. The reasoning is similar
to the previous one.
Proposition 6.1 For every K ∈ {truncation, suppression, insertion, edit} the fol-
lowing relation holds
Y .K X ¹ Y [fK]
where fK is a relabeling function definition of which depend on K.
In order to prove this proposition we prove the following four lemmas. The proof
of the proposition comes trivially from the union of the proof of the lemmas.
Lemma A.1 The following relation holds
Y .T X ¹ Y [fT ] (11)
where fT is the identity function.
Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
ST = {(E .T F,E[fT ])|E,F ∈ E}
Note that being fT the identity function we could omit it without loss of generality.
Assume that E .T F
a→ E′ .T F ′ with the additional hypothesis that F a→ F ′ then,
by the rule of .T we have that E
α⇒ E′ and, obviously, (E′ .T F ′, E′) ∈ ST .
Lemma A.2 The following relation holds
Y .S X ¹ Y [fS ] (12)
where
fS(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a = −a
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Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
SS = {(E .S F,E[fS ])|E,F ∈ E}
There are two possible cases: the first one is when E .S F performs the action a. The
proof of this case is the same of the proof of lemma A.1. If E .S F
τ−→ E′ .S F ′
means that E −a−→ E′ and F perform an action a that E should not perform. Applying
the relabeling function fS to E we obtain E1 = E[fS ] s.t. E1
τ=⇒ E′1. where E′1 is
E′[fS ]. Hence (E′ .S F ′, E′1) ∈ SS .
Lemma A.3 The following relation holds
Y .I X ¹ Y [fI ] (13)
where
fI(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a = +a
Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
SI = {(E .I F,E[fI ])|E,F ∈ E}
There are two possible cases: the first one is when E .I F performs the action a. The
proof of this case is the same of the proof of lemma A.1. If E .I F
b−→ E′ .I F means
that E +a.b−→ E′ and F perform an action a that E should not perform in order to go
in the state E′. Applying the relabeling function fI to E we obtain E1 = E[fI ] s.t.
E1
b=⇒ E′1. where E′1 is E′[fI ]. Hence (E′ .I F ′, E′1) ∈ SI .
Lemma A.4 The following relation holds
Y .E X ¹ Y [fE ] (14)
where
fE(a) =
{
a if a ∈ Act
τ if a ∈ {−a,+a}
Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
SE = {(E .E F,E[fE ])|E,F ∈ E}
There are three possible cases: the first one is when E .E F performs the action a.
The proof of this case is the same of the proof of lemma A.1. the other two case is the
following:
• E.EF τ−→ E′.EF ′ we want to find a E′[fE ] s.t. E[fE ] τ−→ E[fE ]′. Referring
to the second rule of the edit automata we see that E .E F
τ−→ E′ .E F ′ when
E
−a−→ E′. Through the relabeling function fE we have E[fE ] τ−→ E′[fE ] and
(E′ .E F ′, E′[fE ]) ∈ SE .
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• E.E F b−→ E′ .E F we want to find a E′[fE ] s.t. E[fE ] b=⇒ E[fE ]′. Referring
to the last rule of edit automata we see thatE.EF
b−→ E′.EF whenE +a.b−→ E′.
Through the relabeling function fE we have E[fE ]
b=⇒ E′[fE ] and (E′ .E
F,E′[fE ]) ∈ SE
Proposition 6.2 Let E and F be two finite state processes and φ ∈ Frµ. If F ¹ E
then E |= φ⇒ F |= φ.
Proof : A translation from equational µ-calculus to modal µ-calculus is possible.
So first of all we consider the modal formula associated with the given formula φ then
the proof may be divided in two part. Former we prove the proposition holds for the
formulae of modal µ-calculus without recursion operator, latter we extended the results
also to µX.φ and νX.φ.
The first part is very similar to the proof proposed by Stirling in [43] that is made
by induction on the structure of the formula φ. The base case is clear. For the inductive
step first suppose φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 and that the result holds for the components φ1 and φ2.
By the definition of satisfaction relation E |= φ iff E |= φ1 and E |= φ2. By inductive
hypothesis F |= φ1 and F |= φ2 then F |= φ. A similar argument justifies the case
φ = φ1 ∨ φ2. Next suppose φ = [a]φ1 and E |= φ. Therefore for any E′ s.t. E a⇒ E′
it follows that E′ |= φ1. Let F a→ F ′ we know that for some E′ there is the transition
E
a⇒ E′ and F ′ ¹ E′, so by inductive hypothesis F ′ |= φ1 and so F |= φ. Now we
have to prove that if φ = µX.φ1 or φ = νX.φ1 the proposition holds. Referring to the
definition of minimum and maximum fixed point we can consider these as inductive
limit (the union) of formulae like µXα.φ1, where µX0.φ1 = F and µXα+1.φ1 =
φ1[µXα.φ1/X], and νXα.φ1 where νX0.φ1 = T and νXα+1.φ1 = φ1[νXα.φ1/X].
In this way E |= µX.φ1 iff E |= µXα.φ1 for some α iff E |=
∨
α(µX
α.φ1) and
E |= νX.φ1 iff E |= νXα.φ1 for all α iff E |=
∧
α(νX
α.φ1). In the former case we
have a sequence of disjunction and in the latter we have a sequence of conjunction. We
can apply again the argument of the first part of the proof.
Proposition 8.1: Let E and F be two finite-state processes. If both E and F are
weakly time alive, also E .K F is weakly time alive.
In order to prove this proposition we prove four lemmas, one for each of the four
operators.
Lemma A.5 If both E and F are weakly time alive, also E .T F is weakly time alive.
Proof : We want to prove that for all (E .T F )′ ∈ Der(E .T F ) (E .T F )′ tick=⇒. E
and F are time alive so
• for all E′ ∈ Der(E) E′ tick=⇒
• for all F ′ ∈ Der(F ) F ′ tick=⇒
So ∃E′, F ′ such that (E .T F )′ = E′ .T F ′ and, referring to the semantic rule of .T
E′ .T F ′
tick=⇒
Lemma A.6 If both E and F are weakly time alive, also E .S F is weakly time alive.
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Proof : In this case the prove is very similar to the previous one, so we omit it.
Lemma A.7 If both E and F are weakly time alive, also E .I F is weakly time alive.
Proof : The proof in this case is just a bit different. We want to prove that for all
(E .I F )′ ∈ Der(E .I F ) (E .I F )′ tick=⇒. E and F are time alive so
• for all E′ ∈ Der(E) E′ tick=⇒
• for all F ′ ∈ Der(F ) F ′ tick=⇒
We have two cases: if the first semantic rule is applied (E .I F )′ = E′ .I F ′ and
the prove is the same of the previous lemma. If the second rule is applied we have
(E .I F )′ = E′ .I F . Noting that F ∈ Der(F ) we can follow the same reasoning do
before. .
Lemma A.8 If both E and F are weakly time alive, also E .E F is weakly time alive.
Proof : The cases the could be happened here are the same of the lemma A.6 and lemma
A.7. So we omit it. .
Proposition 8.4: Let we consider the controller operator .T .It is possible to find
Y1, . . . Yn controller programs s.t. if Y1 .T X |= φ1, . . . , Yn .T X |= φn then (Y1 .T
. . . .T Yn) .T X |= φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn.
In order to prove the previous proposition we prove some lemmas.
Lemma A.9 The following relation holds
Y .T X ¹ X (15)
Proof: We prove that the following relation is a weak simulation.
S = {(E .T F, F )|E,F ∈ E}
Assume that E .T F
a→ E′ .T F ′ with the additional hypothesis that F a→ F ′ then, by
the rule of .T we have that E
α⇒ E′ and, obviously, (E′ .T F ′, F ′) ∈ S .
Lemma 8.1: Let φ be a safety property, conjunction of n safety properties, i.e.
φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ . . . ∧ φn where φ1, . . . φn are safety properties. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be n
controller programs s.t. ∀i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ n Yi |= φi. We have
∀X Yn .T (Yn−1 .T (. . . .T (Y2 .T (Y1 .T X)))) |= φ
Proof : For induction on the number of the formulae in the conjunction n:
n = 1: In this case φ = φ1. Hence, by exploiting the satisfiability procedure we obtain
Y = Y1 that is the controller program s.t. Y .T X |= φ.
n⇒ n+ 1: Let φ be a formula s.t. φ = φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn+1 and Yn+1 be a controller
program s.t. ∀X Yn+1 .T X |= φn+1. For inductive hypothesis we know that
∀X Yn .T (Yn−1 .T (. . . .T (Y2 .T (Y1 .T X)))) |= φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn. We have to
prove that ∀X Yn+1 .T (Yn .T (Yn−1 .T (. . . .T (Y2 .T (Y1 .T X))))) |= φ.
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For sake of simplicity, we denote by Y n the process Yn.T (Yn−1.T (. . ..T (Y2.T
(Y1.TX)))). We know that ∀X Yn+1.TX |= φn+1, so Yn+1.T Y n |= φn+1.
For Lemma 6.2 and Lemma A.9, Yn+1 .T Y n |= φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn. Hence, for the
definition of conjunction Yn+1 .T Y n |= φ.
Lemma A.10 Let φ, Y1, . . . , Yn be as in Lemma 8.1. We have that ∀X
Yn .T (Yn−1 .T (. . . .T (Y2 .T (Y1 .T X)))) |= φ
⇓
(Yn .T . . . .T Y1) .T X |= φ
holds.
Proof : For induction on the number of controller programs n:
n = 1: Trivial.
n⇒ n+ 1: For hypothesis we have that
1. ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, ∀X Yi .T X |= φi;
2.
∀X Yn .T (Yn−1 .T (. . . .T (Y2 .T (Y1 .T X)))) |= φ
⇓
∀X (Yn .t . . . .T Y1) .T X |= φ
We want to prove that
∀X Yn+1 .T (Yn .T (. . . .T (Y2 .T (Y1 .T X)))) |= φ
⇓
∀X (Yn+1 .t . . . .T Y1) .T X |= φ
For sake of simplicity we denote by Y n.T the process (Yn .T . . . .T Y1). For
hypothesis 1 we can consider Y n asX so, Yn+1.T Y n.T |= φn+1. For Lemma 8.1
and hypothesis 2 Y n.T .T Yn+1 |= φ1∧ . . .∧φn. Since Y n.T .T Yn+1 and Yn+1 .T
Y n.T are bisimilar so they satisfy the same formulae (see [43]). In particular
Yn+1 .T Y
n
.T |= φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn. Hence Yn+1 .T Y n.T |= φ. For Lemma A.9, we
conclude that ∀X (Yn+1 .t . . . .T Y1) .T X |= φ.
Proof Proposition 8.4: It follows directly from proofs of Lemma 8.1 and Lemma
A.10.
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